This paper elaborates on the security architecture of WhatsApp and performs an analysis on the various protocols used. The metadata can reveal just enough information to show connections between people, their patterns, and personal information. Finally, we argue that simply encrypting the end-to-end channel cannot preserve privacy. We report that the Signal Protocol, which forms the basis of WhatsApp end-to-end encryption, does offer protection against forward secrecy, and MITM to a large extent. In this paper we analyze the WhatsApp messaging platform and critique its security architecture along with a focus on its privacy preservation mechanisms. This means that all messages (SMS), phone calls, videos, audios, and any other form of information exchanged cannot be read by any unauthorized entity since WhatsApp. In April 2016, WhatsApp switched to a default end-to-end encrypted service. Over one billion people worldwide for free messaging, calling, and media sharing use it. WhatsApp messenger is arguably the most popular mobile app available on all smart-phones.

Whatsapp messenger theverge